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The Principle of Distinction and Military Objectives
n its Advisory Opinion of 1996 on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, the International Court of Justice recognized the “principle of
distinction”—between combatants and noncombatants (civilians)—as a fun-
damental and “intransgressible” principle of customary international law.1 The
requirement of distinction between combatants and civilians lies at the root of
the jus in bello. It is reflected in Article 48 of Protocol Additional I of 1977 to the
1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, entitled “Basic
rule:” “the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civil-
ian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objec-
tives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives.”2 There is no doubt that, irrespective of objections to sundry other
1. Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. Reports
226, 257 (July 8).
2. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 447 (Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff eds., 3d. ed.
2000) [hereinafter Protocol I].
stipulations of Protocol I,3 “the principle of the military objective has become
a part of customary international law for armed conflict” whether on land, at
sea or in the air.4
The coinage “military objectives” first came into use in the non-binding
1923 Rules of Air Warfare, drawn up at The Hague by a Commission of
Jurists5 (set up in 1922 by the Washington Conference on the Limitation of
Armament). It also appears in the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protec-
tion of War Victims6 (which fail to define it7), the 1954 Hague Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict8 and
especially the 1999 Second Protocol appended to the Cultural Property
Convention,9 as well as the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Court.10
A binding definition of military objectives was crafted in 1977, in Article
52(2) of Protocol I:
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military
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3. See, e.g., Guy Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War: The Case against Ratification of
Additional Protocol I, 26 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 109, 124–170
(1985–1986).
4. See Horace Robertson, The Principle of the Military Objective in the Law of Armed Conflict 197,
207, in THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, LIBER AMICORUM PROFESSOR JACK
GRUNAWALT (Michael Schmitt ed., 1998) (Vol. 72, US Naval War College International Law
Studies).
5. Hague Rules of Air Warfare, 1923, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2, art.
24(1), at 139, 144.
6. See Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2,
art. 19 2d para., at 195, 205; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, id., art. 18 5th para., at 299, 308. Both texts refer to the
perils to which medical establishments may be exposed by being situated close to “military
objectives.”
7. See EDWARD KWAKWA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: PERSONAL
AND MATERIAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION 141 (1992).
8. Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
May 14, 1954, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2, art. 8(1)(a), at 371, 376.
9. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2,
art. 6(a), 8, 13(1)(b), at 699, 702, 703–4, 706.
10. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b)(ii), (v), (ix), at 667, 676–7.
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.11
The term “attacks” is defined in Article 49(1) of the Protocol as “acts of vi-
olence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.”12 Any act of
violence fits this matrix: not only massive air attacks or artillery barrages, but
also small-scale attacks (like a sniper firing a single bullet). As Article 52(2)
elucidates, all attacks must be strictly limited to military objectives.
The definition of military objectives appearing in Article 52(2) is repeated
word-for-word in several subsequent instruments: Protocols II and III, An-
nexed to the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively In-
jurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects;13 and the 1999 Second Protocol to
the Hague Cultural Property Convention.14 It is also replicated in the
(non-binding) San Remo Manual of 1995 on International Law Applicable to
Armed Conflicts at Sea.15 Many scholars regard the definition as embodying
customary international law.16 With one significant textual modification—to
be examined infra—that is also the view of the United States, which objects
on other grounds to Protocol I.17
Notwithstanding its authoritative status, Article 52(2)’s definition leaves a
lot to be desired. It is an exaggeration to claim (as does Antonio Cassese) that
“[t]his definition is so sweeping that it can cover practically anything.”18 Still,
it is regrettable that the wording is abstract and generic, and no list of specific
military objectives is provided (if only on an illustrative, non-exhaustive basis).
Under Article 57(2)(a)(i) of the Protocol, those who plan or decide upon an
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11. Protocol I, supra note 2, at 450.
12. Id. at 447.
13. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10,
1980, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 2, at 515; Protocol II on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices, id., art. 2(4), at 528; Protocol
III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, id., art. 1(3), at 533.
14. Second Protocol, supra note 9, art. 1(f), at 701.
15. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT
SEA 114 (Louis Doswald-Beck ed., 1995).
16. See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY
LAW 64–65 (1989).
17. See ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS 402 n.9 (A.R. Thomas & J.C. Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73, US Naval
War College International Law Studies).
18. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 339 (2001).
attack must “do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be at-
tacked . . . are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article
52.”19 Due to its abstract character, the definition in Article 52(2) does not
produce a workable acid test for such verification. The text lends itself to “di-
vergent interpretations” in application, and, needless to say, perhaps,
“[a]mbiguous language encourages abuse.”20
The relative advantages of a general definition versus an enumeration of mili-
tary objectives—or a combination of both—have been thoroughly discussed in
connection with the preparation of the San Remo Manual.21 The present
writer believes that only a composite definition—combining an abstract state-
ment with a non-exhaustive catalogue of concrete illustrations22—can effec-
tively avoid vagueness, on the one hand, and inability to anticipate future
scenarios, on the other. No abstract definition standing by itself (unaccompa-
nied by actual examples) can possibly offer a practical solution to real problems
emerging—often in dismaying rapidity—on the battlefield.
The noun “objects,” used in the definition, clearly encompasses material
and tangible things.23 However, the phrase “military objectives” is certainly
not limited to inanimate objects,24 and it is wrong to suggest that the Proto-
col’s language fails to cover enemy military personnel.25 To be on the safe side,
the framers of Article 52(2) added the (otherwise superfluous) words “[i]n so
far as objects are concerned,” underscoring that not only inanimate objects
constitute military objectives. Human beings can categorically come within
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19. Protocol I, supra note 2, at 452.
20. ESBJORN ROSENBLAD, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 71
(1979).
21. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, at 114–116. See also William Fenrick, Military
Objectives in the Law of Naval Warfare, in THE MILITARY OBJECTIVE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
DISTINCTION IN THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: REPORT, COMMENTARIES AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROUND-TABLE OF EXPERTS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA 1, 4–5 (Wolff Heintschel v. Heinegg ed.,
1991).
22. This legal technique is epitomized in Articles 2–3 of the 1974 General Assembly consensus
Definition of Aggression, G.A. Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 15 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS:
SERIES I, RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 392, 393 (Dusan Djonovich
ed., 1984).
23. Claude Pilloud & Jean Pictet, Article 52, in COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 633–4
(Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
24. See A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 33 (1996).
25. Such a suggestion is made by Hamilton DeSaussure, Comment, 31 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW 883, 885 (1981–1982).
the ambit of military objectives.26 Indeed, human beings are not the only living
creatures that do. Certain types of animals—cavalry horses and pack mules in
particular—can also be legitimate targets.
The pivotal issue is what ingredient or dimension serves to identify a mili-
tary objective. On the face of it, under Article 52(2), an object must fulfill two
cumulative criteria in order to qualify as a military objective: (a) by nature, lo-
cation, purpose or use it must make an effective contribution to military ac-
tion; and (b) its destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances
ruling at the time, must offer a definite military advantage.27 However,
In practice . . . one cannot imagine that the destruction, capture, or
neutralization of an object contributing to the military action of one side would
not be militarily advantageous for the enemy; it is just as difficult to imagine how
the destruction, capture, or neutralization of an object could be a military
advantage for one side if that same object did not somehow contribute to the
military action of the enemy.28
Article 52(2) refers to “a definite military advantage” that must be gained
from the (total or partial) destruction, capture or neutralization29 of the tar-
gets. The expression “a definite military advantage” (like “military objec-
tives”) is derived from the Hague Rules of Air Warfare, which resorted to the
formula “a distinct military advantage.”30 There is no apparent difference in
the present context between the adjectives “distinct” and “definite” or, for
that matter, several other alternatives pondered by the framers of Article
52(2).31 Whatever the adjective preferred, the idea conveyed is that of “a
concrete and perceptible military advantage rather than a hypothetical and
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26. See Elmar Rauch, Attack Restraints, Target Limitations and Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons, 18 REVUE DE DROIT PÉNAL MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA
GUERRE 51, 55 (1979).
27. See MARCO SASSÒLI & ANTOINE BOUVIER, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR: CASES,
DOCUMENTS, AND TEACHING MATERIALS ON CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 161 (1999).
28. Id. at 140.
29. The term “neutralization” in this setting means denial of use of an objective to the enemy
without destroying it. See Waldemar Solf, Article 52, in NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 318, 325 (Michael Bothe, Karl Partsch & Waldemar Solf eds.,
1982).
30. Hague Rules of Air Warfare, supra note 5, art. 24(1), at 144.
31. See Frits Kalshoven, Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 1974–1977, Part II, 9
NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 107, 111 (1978).
speculative one.”32 The advantage gained must be military and not, say,
purely political33 (hence, “forcing a change in the negotiating attitudes” of
the adverse party34 cannot be deemed a proper military advantage). But when
coalition war is being waged, the military advantage may accrue to the benefit
of an allied country—or the alliance in general—rather than the attacking
party itself.35
The process of appraising military advantage must be made against the
background of the circumstances prevailing at the time, so that the same ob-
ject may be legitimately attacked in one temporal framework but not in oth-
ers.36 A church, as a place of worship, is not a military objective; nor is it a
military objective when converted into a hospital; yet, if the church steeple is
used by snipers, it becomes a military objective.37 In this sense, the definition
of military objectives is “relativized:”38 there is “no fixed borderline between
civilian objects and military objectives.”39
The trouble is that the notion of “military advantage” is not singularly
helpful. Surely, military advantage is not restricted to tactical gains.40 The
spectrum is necessarily wide, and it extends to the security of the attacking
force.41 The key problem is that the outlook of the attacking party is unlikely
to match that of the party under attack in evaluating the long-term military
benefits of any action contemplated.42 Moreover, the dominant view is that
assessment of the military advantage can be made in light of “an attack as a
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32. Solf, supra note 29, at 326.
33. See Hamilton DeSaussure, Remarks, 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 511, 513–514 (1987).
34. Forcing such a change is viewed (wrongly) as a legitimate military advantage by Burrus
Carnahan, ‘Linebacker II’ and Protocol I: The Convergence of Law and Professionalism, 31
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 861, 867 (1981–1982).
35. See Henri Meyrowitz, Le Bombardement Stratégique d’après le Protocole Additionnel I aux
Conventions de Genève, 41 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VÖLKERRECHT (ZAÖRV) 1, 41 (1981).
36. See DeSaussure, supra note 33, at 513.
37. See B.A. Wortley, Observations on the Revision of the 1949 Geneva ‘Red Cross’ Conventions, 54
BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 143, 154 (1983).
38. GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 272 (1994).
39. Albrecht Randelzhofer, Civilian Objects, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 603, 604 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992).
40. See James Burger, International Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo Crisis: Lessons Learned or to
Be Learned, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 129, 132 (2000).
41. See ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 17, at 402.
42. See Dieter Fleck, Strategic Bombing and the Definition of Military Objectives, 27 ISRAEL
YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 41, 48 (1997).
whole,” as distinct from “isolated or specific parts of the attack.”43 The attack-
ing party may thus argue, e.g., that an air raid of no perceptible military
advantage in itself is justified by having misled the enemy to shift its stra-
tegic gaze to the wrong sector of the front.44 Nonetheless, “an attack as a
whole” is a finite event, not to be confused with the entire war.45
The Definition of Military Objectives by Nature, Location, Purpose and Use
The text of Article 52(2) incorporates helpful definitional guidelines by ad-
verting to the nature, location, purpose and use of military objectives “making
an effective contribution to military action.” The requirement of effective
contribution relates to military action in general, and there need be no “direct
connection” with specific combat operations.46 All the same, an American at-
tempt (reflected in the United States’ Commander’s Handbook on the Law of
Naval Operations47) to substitute the words “military action” by the idiom
“war-fighting or war-sustaining capability,” goes too far.48 The “war-fighting”
limb can pass muster, since it may be looked upon as equivalent to military ac-
tion.49 But the “war-sustaining” portion is too broad. The American position
is that “[e]conomic targets of the enemy that indirectly but effectively support
and sustain the enemy’s war-fighting capability may also be attacked,” and the
example offered is that of the destruction of raw cotton within Confederate
territory by Union forces during the Civil War on the ground that the sale of
cotton provided funds for almost all Confederate arms and ammunition.50 As
will be seen infra, multiple economic objects do constitute military objectives,
inasmuch as they directly support military action. Yet, the raw cotton illustra-
tion (which may be substituted today by the instance of a country relying
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43. See Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN
LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 105, 162 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995).
44. See Solf, supra note 29, at 325.
45. See Francoise Hampson, Means and Methods of Warfare in the Conflict in the Gulf, in THE
GULF WAR 1990–91 IN INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAW 89, 94 (Peter Rowe ed., 1993).
46. See Solf, supra note 29, at 324.
47. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 17, at 402.
48. See JAMES BUSUTTIL, NAVAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF
WAR 148 (1998).
49. Roberts, supra note 4, at 209.
50. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 17, at 403.
almost entirely on the export of coffee beans or bananas)51 displays the danger
of introducing the slippery-slope concept of “war-sustaining capability.” The
connection between military action and exports, required to finance the
war effort, is “too remote.”52 Had raw cotton been acknowledged as a valid
military objective, almost every civilian activity might be construed by the
enemy as indirectly sustaining the war effort (especially when hostilities
are protracted). For an object to qualify as a military objective, there must ex-
ist a proximate nexus to military action (or “war-fighting”). No wonder that
the San Remo Manual rejected an attempt to incorporate the wording “war-
sustaining effort.”53
As far as “nature, location, purpose or use” are concerned, each of these
terms deserves a closer look.
1. The Nature of the Objective
“Nature” denotes the intrinsic character of the military objective. To meet
this yardstick, an object (or living creature) must be endowed with some in-
herent attribute which eo ipso makes an effective contribution to military ac-
tion. As such, the object, person, etc., automatically constitutes a legitimate
target for attack in wartime.
Although no list of military objectives by nature has been compiled in a
binding manner, the following non-exhaustive enumeration is believed by the
present writer to reflect current legal thinking:54
(a) Fixed military fortifications, bases, barracks55 and installations, including
training and war-gaming facilities;
(b) Temporary military camps, entrenchments, staging areas, deployment
positions, and embarkation points;
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51. See ROGERS, supra note 24, at 41.
52. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 15, at 161.
53. Id. at 150.
54. Compare the various lists of legitimate military objectives offered by ANNOTATED
SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
supra note 17, at 402; A.P.V. ROGERS & PAUL MALHERBE, MODEL MANUAL ON THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT 72 (1999). See also LESLIE GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT 191 (2d ed. 2000).
55. A question has been raised about the status of deserted military barracks (see Konstantin
Obradovic, International Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo Crisis, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
OF THE RED CROSS 699, 720 (2000)). But the whole point about military barracks is that they
constitute a military objective per se, irrespective of being deserted. When military units are
stationed there, they qualify as military objectives by themselves (see (c)).
(c) Military units and individual members of the armed forces, whether
stationed or mobile;
(d) Weapon systems, military equipment and ordnance, armor and artillery,
and military vehicles of all types;
(e) Military aircraft and missiles of all types;
(f) Military airfields and missile launching sites;
(g) Warships (whether surface vessels or submarines) of all types;
(h) Military ports and docks;
(i) Military depots, munitions dumps, warehouses or stockrooms for the
storage of weapons, ordnance, military equipment and supplies (including
raw materials for military use, such as petroleum);
(j) Factories (even when privately owned) engaged in the manufacture of
arms, munitions and military supplies;
(k) Laboratories or other facilities for the research and development of new
weapons and military devices;
(l) Military repair facilities;
(m) Power plants (electric, hydroelectric, etc.) serving the military;
(n) Arteries of transportation of strategic importance, principally mainline
railroads and rail marshaling yards, major motorways (like the interstate
highways in the US,56 the Autobahnen in Germany and the autostradas in
Italy), navigable rivers and canals (including the tunnels and bridges of
railways and trunk roads);
(o) Ministries of Defense and any national, regional or local operational or
coordination center of command, control and communication relating to
running the war (including computer centers, as well as telephone and
telegraph exchanges, for military use);




56. Appropriately enough, the mammoth US interstate highway network (with a total length of
more than 45,000 miles)—initiated by President Eisenhower—is formally known as the
National System of Interstate and Defense Highways. See 26 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA 324 (15th ed. 1997).
2. The Purpose of the Objective
More often than not, the “purpose” of a military objective is determined ei-
ther by its (inherent) nature or by its (de facto) use. But if the word “purpose”
in Article 52(2) is not redundant, it must be distinguished from both nature
and use. The present writer is of the opinion that the purpose of an object—as
a separate ground for classifying it as a military target—is determined after the
crystallization of its original nature, yet prior to actual use. In other words, the
military purpose is assumed not to be stamped on the objective from the outset
(otherwise, the target would be military by nature). Military purpose is de-
duced from an established intention of a belligerent as regards future use. As
pointed out by the official ICRC Commentary: “the criterion of purpose is con-
cerned with the intended future use of an object, while that of use is con-
cerned with its present function.”57
At times, enemy intentions are crystal clear, and then the branding of an
object (by purpose) as a military target becomes rather easy. A good illustra-
tion might be that of a civilian luxury liner, which a belligerent overtly plans
(already in peacetime) to turn into a troop ship at the moment of general mo-
bilization. Although by nature a civilian object, and not yet in use as a troop
ship, it may be attacked as a military objective at the outbreak of hostilities
(assuming that it is no longer serving as a passenger liner).
Unfortunately, most enemy intentions are not so easy to decipher, and
then much depends on the gathering and analysis of intelligence which may
be faulty. In case of doubt, caution is called for. Thus, field intelligence reveal-
ing that the enemy intends to use a particular school as a munitions depot
does not justify an attack against the school as long as the munitions have not
been moved in.58 The Allied bombing in 1944 of the famous Abbey of Monte
Cassino is a notorious case of a decision founded on flimsy intelligence re-
ports, linked to a firm supposition (“the abbey made such a perfect observa-
tion point that surely no army could have refrained from using it”) which
turned out to have been entirely false.59 This writer cannot accept the conclu-
sion that the Abbey was a military objective only because it appeared to be
important to deny its potential use to an enemy (who in reality refrained from
using it).60 Purpose is predicated on intentions known to guide the adversary,




57. Pilloud & Pictet, supra note 23, at 636.
58. See ROGERS, supra note 24, at 36.
59. Id. at 54–55.
60. Id. at 55.
3. The Use of the Objective
Actual “use” of an objective does not depend necessarily on its original na-
ture or on any (later) intended purpose. A leading example is that of the cele-
brated “Taxis of the Marne” commandeered in September 1914 to transport
French reserves to the frontline, thereby saving Paris from the advancing
German forces.61 “So long as these privately owned taxicabs were operated for
profit and served their normal purposes, they were not military equipment.
Once they were requisitioned for the transportation of French troops, their
function changed.”62 They became military objectives through use.
Article 52(3) of the Protocol prescribes: “In case of doubt whether an ob-
ject which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of wor-
ship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective
contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.”63
There are three elements here:
(a) Certain objects are normally (by nature) dedicated to civilian purposes
and, as long as they fulfill only their essential function, they must not be
treated as military targets. The examples given are places of worship, civilian
dwellings and schools.
(b) The same objects may nevertheless be used in actuality in a manner
making an effective contribution to military action. When (and as long as)
they are subject to such use, outside their original function, they can be
treated as military objectives. The dominant consideration should be “the cir-
cumstances ruling at the time” (referred to in the text of Article 52(2)).
(c) Article 52(3) adds a caveat that, in case of doubt whether an object
normally dedicated to civilian purposes is actually used to make an effective
contribution to military action, it must “be presumed not to be so used.” The
presumption has given rise to controversy at the time of the drafting of this
clause, and an attempt to create an exception with respect to objects located
in the contact zone failed in the ensuing vote.64 While the results of the vote
may reflect a “[r]efusal to recognize the realities of combat” in some situa-
tions,65 it must be taken into account that the presumption (which is
rebuttable) comes into play only in case of doubt. Often there is no doubt at
all, especially when combatants are exposed to direct fire from a supposedly
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61. See GEORGE SCHWARZENBERGER, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 112 (1968).
62. Id. at 113.
63. Protocol I, supra note 2, at 450.
64. See Solf, supra note 29, at 326–327.
65. See W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 1, 137 (1990).
civilian object.66 If, for instance, the minaret of a mosque is used as a sniper’s
nest, the presumption is rebutted and the enemy is entitled to treat it as a
military objective.67 The degree of doubt that has to exist prior to the emer-
gence of the (rebuttable) presumption is by no means clear. But surely that
doubt has to exist in the mind of the attacker, based upon “the circumstances
ruling at the time.”
It follows that, by dint of military use (or, more precisely, abuse), virtually
every civilian object—albeit, innately, deemed worthy of protection by the jus
in bello—can become a military objective.68
4. The Location of the Objective
“Location” of an objective must be factored in, irrespective of the nature,
purpose and use thereof. Logic dictates that, if a civilian-by-nature object (like
a supermarket) is located within a sprawling military base, it cannot be im-
mune from attack. If a merchant vessel is anchored in a military port, it be-
comes a military objective by location.
The real issue with respect to location goes beyond these elementary obser-
vations. The notion underlying the reference to location is that a specific land
area can be regarded per se as a military objective.69 Surely, the incidence of
such locations cannot be too widespread: there must be a distinctive feature
turning a piece of land into a military objective (e.g., a mountain pass, a spe-
cific hill of strategic value, a bridgehead or a spit of land controlling the en-
trance of a harbor).70
5. Bridges
The quadruple subdivision of military objectives by nature, purpose, use
and location is not as neat as it sounds, and certain objectives can be cata-
logued within more than one subset. Bridges may serve as a prime illustration.
Bridges constructed for the engineering needs of major motorways and rail
tracks are surely integrated in the overall network: like the roads and the
tracks that they serve, they constitute military objectives by nature. But even
where bridges connect non-arterial lines of transportation, as long as they are
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66. See Solf, supra note 29, at 327.
67. Countless other examples can be postulated. Rogers refers to the case of a cathedral used as
divisional headquarters. ROGERS, supra note 24, at 35.
68. See SASSÒLI & BOUVIER, supra note 27, at 161.
69. For the underlying reasons, see ROGERS, supra note 24, at 38–39.
70. See Elmar Rauch, The Protection of the Civilian Population in International Armed Conflicts and
the Use of Landmines, 24 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 262, 273–277 (1981).
apt to have a perceptible role in the transport of military reinforcements and
supplies, their destruction is almost self-explanatory as a measure playing
havoc with enemy logistics. It is wrong to assume (as does Michael Bothe in
the context of bridges targeted during the Kosovo air campaign of 1999) that
bridges can be attacked only “where supplies destined for the front must pass
over” them.71 The destruction of bridges can be effected to disrupt any
movements of troops and military supplies, not necessarily in the direction
of the front.
If not by nature, most bridges may qualify as military objectives by purpose,
use or—above all—location.72 Every significant waterway or similar geophysi-
cal obstruction to traffic (like a ravine) must be perceived as a possible military
barrier, and there comes a time when the strategy of either belligerent would
dictate that all bridges (even the smallest pedestrian overpass) across the ob-
stacle have to be destroyed or neutralized. Surely, there is nothing wrong in a
military policy striving to effect a fragmentation of enemy land forces through
the destruction of all bridges—however minor in themselves—spanning a
wide river. Thus, in the Gulf War in 1991, destruction of bridges over the Eu-
phrates River impeded the deployment of Iraqi forces and their supplies (sev-
ering also communications cables).73
It has been asserted that “[b]ridges are not, as such, military objectives,”74
and that a bridge is like a school: the question whether it “represents a military
objective depends entirely on the actual situation.”75 However, the compari-
son between bridges and schools is meretricious. A school is recognized as a
military objective only in the extraordinary circumstances of military use by
the adverse party. A bridge, as a rule, would qualify as a military objective (by
nature, location, purpose or use). It would fail to be a military objective only
under exceptional conditions, when it is neither actually nor potentially of any
military use to the enemy.
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6. Military Objectives Exempt from Attack
The determination that an object constitutes a military objective is not al-
ways conclusive in legitimizing an attack. Some objects are exempted from at-
tack, notwithstanding their distinct character as military objectives. The most
extreme illustration appears in Article 56(1) of the Protocol:
Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and
nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack,
even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the
release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian
population. Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works
and installations shall not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause
the release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent
severe losses among the civilian population.76
Granted, according to Article 56(2), the special protection is not unquali-
fied: it ceases when the dam, dyke or nuclear electrical generating station
regularly, significantly and directly supports military operations, and there is no
other feasible way to terminate such support.77 In any event, the entire stipu-
lation of Article 56 is innovative and binding only on contracting Parties.
For their part, the Geneva Conventions prohibit attacks against protected
military persons, i.e., those combatants who become hors de combat, either by
choice (through surrender) or by force of circumstances (being wounded, sick
or shipwrecked);78 fixed establishments and mobile military medical units of
the Medical Service; 79 hospital ships;80 medical aircraft;81 medical personnel
engaged in the treatment of the wounded and sick;82 and chaplains attached
to the armed forces83 (to name the most important categories). Protection
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from attack is also granted by customary international law to other categories,
like cartel ships.84
Additionally, an attack against a military objective—which is not protected
as such—may be illicit owing to the principle of proportionality, whereby the
“collateral damage” or injury to civilians (or civilian objects) must not be ex-
cessive. This issue is dealt with separately by the present writer.
General Problems Relating to the Scope of Military Objectives
The definition of military objectives, as discussed supra, raises a number of
question marks:
1. Retreating troops
It is sometimes contended that when an army has been routed, and its sol-
diers are retreating in disarray—as epitomized by the Iraqi land forces during
the Gulf War—they should not be further attacked.85 But this is a serious mis-
conception. The only way for members of the armed forces to immunize them-
selves from further attack is to surrender, thereby becoming hors de combat.86
Otherwise, as the Gulf War amply demonstrates, the fleeing soldiers of today
are likely to regroup tomorrow as viable military units.
2. Targeting Individuals
Is it permissible to target specific individuals who are members of the
armed forces? As a rule, when a person takes up arms or merely dons a uni-
form as a member of the armed forces, he automatically exposes himself to en-
emy attack (even if he does not participate in actual hostilities and does not
pose an immediate threat to the enemy). The jus in bello prohibits treacherous
assassination, yet nothing prevents singling out as a target an individual en-
emy combatant (provided that the attack is carried out by combatants).87 The
prohibition of assassination does not cover “attacks, by regular armed military
forces, on specific individuals who are themselves legitimate military tar-
gets.”88 The United States was, consequently, well within its rights during
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World War II when it specifically targeted the Commander-in-Chief of the
Japanese Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, whose plane was ambushed (subsequent
to the successful breaking of the Japanese communication codes) and shot
down over Bougainville in 1943.89 The ambush of the car of SS General
Heydrich in 1942 is different, but only because he was killed by members of
the Free Czechoslovak army (parachuted from London) who were not wear-
ing uniforms and were therefore not lawful combatants: otherwise,
Heydrich—as a military officer—was a legitimate target, just like
Yamamoto.90
3. Police
Can police officers and other law enforcement agents be subsumed under
the heading of members of armed forces (who are legitimately subject to at-
tack)? The answer to the question depends on whether the policemen have
been officially incorporated into the armed forces91 or (despite the absence of
official incorporation) have taken part in hostilities.92 If integrated into the
armed forces, policemen—like all combatants—“may be attacked at any time
simply because they have that particular status.”93
4. Industrial plants
It is exceedingly difficult to draw a dividing line between military and civil-
ian industries. Sometimes, even the facts are hard to establish. Who is to say
whether a textile factory is producing military uniforms or civilian clothing?
In wartime, civilian consumption gives way as a matter of course to military
priorities. Can one seriously asseverate that certain steel works ought not to
be classified as military objectives only because their output has heretofore
been channeled to the civilian market? The long-time civilian-oriented char-
acter of an industrial center in peacetime provides no guarantee that produc-
tion would not transition in the course of hostilities into war materials. A line
of production, even when introduced for plainly civilian ends (e.g., tractors
for agricultural use), can often be swiftly adjusted to military use (in this
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instance, the assembly of tracked vehicles, such as tanks). The children’s toys
factory of today may become tomorrow’s leading manufacturer of electronic
precision-munitions. Besides, in the present era of high technology, the con-
struction of any computer hardware architecture or software program can
turn into a central pillar of the war effort.94 “The problem is that the [com-
puter] technology capable of performing . . . [military] functions differs little,
if at all, from that used in the civilian community.”95 If that is not enough,
subcontracting in the manufacture of components of modern weapon systems
causes a dispersion in the fabrication of war materials which is almost impossi-
ble to trail.96 All in all, it is easy to object to the automatic removal of any in-
dustrial plant from the list of military objectives.
5. Oil, coal and other minerals
What is the status of oil fields and rigs, refineries, coal mines, and other
mineral extraction plants, which are not ostensibly tied to military produc-
tion? In the final analysis, despite their civilian bearings, all of them can be
deemed to constitute the infrastructure of the military industry. It can well be
argued that “oil installations of every kind are in fact legitimate military objec-
tives open to destruction by any belligerent.”97 As for petrol filling stations,
only those functioning in civilian residential areas—away from major motor-
ways—may be exempted from attack.
6. Electric grids
Can power plants in civilian metropolitan areas be set apart from military
power plants? During the Gulf War, the Coalition air campaign in 1991
treated as a military target the integrated Iraqi national grid generating and
distributing electricity (used both by the armed forces and civilians).98 Unde-
niably, an integrated power grid makes an effective contribution to modern
military action:99 any shortfall in military requirements can be compensated at
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the expense of civilian needs. Indeed, the Coalition attacks against Iraqi power
generating plants and transformer stations had a great impact on the Iraqi air
defense structure (supported by computers), unconventional weapons research
and development facilities, and telecommunications systems.100 The large-
scale attacks also had unintended—albeit inevitable—non-military conse-
quences, such as the disruption of water supply (due to loss of electric pumps)
and the inability to segregate the electricity that powers a hospital from “other”
electricity in the same lines.101 But these unfortunate results did not detract
from the standing of the Iraqi electric grid system as a military objective.102
7. Civilian airports and maritime ports
It would be imprudent to disregard the possibility that civilian airports and
maritime ports can become hubs of military operations, side by side with con-
tinued civilian activities (which can conceivably be a fig leaf). No wonder that
the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention refers to “an aerodrome” or “a
port”—in a generic fashion—as a military objective.103
8. Trains, trucks and barges
If strategic arteries of transportation come within the bounds of military
objectives (as stated), should the definition not incorporate all the railroad
rolling stock, the truck fleets which are the backbone of motorway traffic,
and the barges plying the rivers and canals? The consequences for civilian
traffic are palpable. Unlike passenger liners or airliners (mentioned infra),
passenger trains do not have any visible hallmarks setting them apart from
troop-carrying trains. If an inter-urban train (as distinct from a city tram) is
sighted from the air, there being no telling signs of the civilian identity of the
train riders, this writer believes that the train would be a legitimate military
objective. In the Kosovo air campaign of 1999, a passenger train (not targeted
as such) was struck while crossing a railway bridge.104 In analyzing the case,
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Natalino Ronzitti seems to take the position that—although the bridge was
no doubt a legitimate military objective—a passenger train should not be at-
tacked.105 However, in the opinion of this writer it would all depend on
whether or not the passengers were identified by the aviators as civilians.
9. Civilian television and radio stations
In wartime, control of civilian broadcasting stations can at any time be as-
sumed by the military apparatus, which may wish to use it in communications
(e.g., summoning reservists to service), in pursuit of psychological warfare,
and for other purposes. In April 1999, NATO intentionally bombed the
(State-owned) Serbian Television and Radio Station in Belgrade.106 Was the
bombing legally warranted? The Committee Established to Review the
NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
averred that if the attack was carried out because the station played a role in
the Serbian propaganda machinery, its legality might well be questioned.107 In
the Committee’s opinion, the attack could be justified only if the TV and ra-
dio transmitters were integrated into the military command and control com-
munications network.108 However, it is noteworthy that the Hague Cultural
Property Convention of 1954 refers to any “broadcasting station” as a military
objective (in the same breath with an aerodrome and a port).109 The phrase
clearly covers civilian TV and radio stations.110
10. Government offices
It is occasionally questioned “whether government buildings are excluded
under any clear rule of law from enemy attack.”111 But this sweeping statement
is wrong. Government offices can be considered a legitimate target for attack
only when used in pursuance or support of military functions. The premises of
the Ministry of Defense have already been mentioned. Any subordinate or in-
dependent Department of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Munitions and so forth
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is embraced. As for the edifice of the Head of State, circumstances vary from
one country to another. Whereas the White House in Washington would
constitute a legitimate military target (since the American President is the
Commander–in-Chief of all US armed forces), Buckingham Palace in London
would not (inasmuch as the Queen has no similar role).
11. Political leadership
Obviously, members of the political leadership of the enemy country can be
attacked (even individually) if they serve in the armed forces.112 Additionally,
when civilian leaders are present in any military installations or government of-
fices constituting military objectives—or when they are visiting either the front
line or munitions factories in the rear areas, when they board military aircraft
or are driven by military command cars, etc.—they expose themselves to dan-
ger. However, notwithstanding the personal risk run when present in a military
objective, a civilian member of the political leadership does not become a mili-
tary objective by himself and cannot be targeted away from such objective.
Defended and Undefended Localities in Land Warfare
The real test in land warfare is whether a given place, inhabited by civilians,
is actually defended by military personnel. Should that be the case, the civil
object becomes—owing to its use—a military objective. The criterion of the
defense of an otherwise civilian place is highlighted in Article 25 of the Hague
Regulations: “The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, vil-
lages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited.”113
Similar language appears in Article 3(c) of the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).114 Article 8(2)(b)(v) of
the Rome Statute brands as a war crime: “Attacking or bombarding, by what-
ever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and
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which are not military objectives.”115 The last words are plainly an addition to
the original Hague formula. They sharpen the issue by denoting that some un-
defended civilian habitations may still constitute military objectives.
Article 59(1) of Protocol I sets forth: “It is prohibited for the Parties to the
conflict to attack, by any means whatsoever, non-defended localities.”116
Once more it is the Hague criterion of defending a place that counts: if a
place is defended, it may be attacked. But the expression “localities,” em-
ployed by the Protocol, is wider than single buildings, albeit narrower than a
whole city or town. This is important to bear in mind, for land warfare cannot
always be analyzed on a building-by-building basis. Not infrequently,
large-scale combat is conducted in an extensive built-up area, particularly a
large city. It goes without saying that “any building sheltering combatants be-
comes a military objective.”117 In extreme cases, when fierce fighting is con-
ducted from house to house (à la Stalingrad), a whole city block—or even
section—may be regarded as a single military objective: partly by (actual) use
and partly by purpose (namely, potential use). The fact that, in the meantime,
a given building within that block or section is not yet occupied by any mili-
tary unit is immaterial. The reasonable expectation is that, as soon as the tide
of battle gets nearer, it would be converted into a military stronghold. Hence,
it may be bombarded even prior to that eventuality. Yet, the old Hague
sweeping reference to a town in toto (defended or undefended) must be re-
garded as obsolete.118
A belligerent desirous of not defending a city—with a view to saving it from
harm’s way—can convey that message effectively to the enemy. Article 59(2)
of the Protocol prescribes:
The appropriate authorities of a Party to the conflict may declare as a
non-defended locality any inhabited place near or in a zone where armed forces
are in contact which is open for occupation by an adverse Party. Such a locality
shall fulfill the following conditions:
(a) all combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military equipment,
must have been evacuated;
(b) no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations or establishments;
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(c) no acts of hostility shall be committed by the authorities or by the
population; and
(d) no activities in support of military operations shall be undertaken.119
There seem to be some complementary implicit conditions not enumerated in
the text: roads and railroads crossing the locality must not be used for military
purposes, and factories situated there must not manufacture products of mili-
tary significance.120 Nevertheless, the presence in the non-defended locality of
police forces retained for the sole purpose of maintaining law and order is per-
missible under Article 59(3).121
Apart from the explicit and implicit cumulative conditions, it is sine qua
non that (i) the declared non-defended locality would be in or near the con-
tact zone,122 and that (ii) it would be open for occupation.123 A declared non-
defended locality cannot be situated in the hinterland—far away from the con-
tact zone—for the simple reason that it is not yet within “the effective grasp of
the attacker’s land forces.”124 Au fond, a non-defended locality cannot be
established in anticipation of future events, but only “in the ‘heat of the mo-
ment’, i.e., when the fighting comes close.”125
Article 59(4) goes on to state that the declaration mentioned in para-
graph (2)—defining as precisely as possible the limits of the non-defended
locality—is to be addressed to the adverse party, which must treat the locality
as non-defended unless the prerequisite conditions are not in fact fulfilled.126
The outcome is that, subject to the observation of all the conditions (specified
and unspecified in the text), the unilateral declaration of a locality as non-
defended binds the adverse party by virtue of the Protocol.127
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Article 59(5) adds that the two parties to the conflict may agree on the es-
tablishment of non-defended localities, even when the conditions are not
met.128 But manifestly, in that case, it is the bilateral agreement (as distinct
from the unilateral declaration) that is decisive. Article 15 of Geneva Con-
vention (IV)129 provides that the belligerents may establish in the combat zone
neutralized areas intended to serve as a shelter for (combatant or noncomba-
tant) sick and wounded, as well as for civilians who perform no work of a mili-
tary character, but the creation of such areas and their demarcation is
contingent on the agreement of the parties.
Special Problems Relating to Sea Warfare
1. Areas of Naval Warfare
Hostile actions by naval forces may be conducted in or over the internal
waters, the territorial sea, the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone
and (where applicable) the archipelagic waters of the belligerent States; the
high seas; and (subject to certain conditions) even the continental shelf and
the exclusive economic zone of neutral States.130 Military objectives at sea in-
clude not only vessels but also fixed installations (especially weapon facilities
and detection or communication devices), which can be emplaced on—or
beneath—the seabed, anywhere within the areas of naval warfare.131 Cables
and pipelines laid on the seabed and serving a belligerent may also constitute
legitimate military objectives.132
2. Warships
Every warship is a military objective. The locution “warships” covers all
military floating platforms, including submarines, light craft (e.g., torpedo
boats), and even unarmed auxiliary naval vessels (except hospital ships). A
warship can be attacked on sight and sunk (within the areas of naval warfare).
“These attacks may be exercised without warning and without regard to the
safety of the enemy crew.”133
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3. Enemy Merchant Vessels
Enemy merchant vessels are generally deemed to be civilian objects, and
are therefore exempt from attack (even though they are subject to capture as
prize).134 Still, the San Remo Manual lists no less than seven exceptions to the
rule.135 In these seven instances, merchant vessels may be attacked and sunk
as military objectives:
(a) When an enemy merchant vessel is engaged directly in belligerent acts
(e.g., laying mines or minesweeping).
(b) When an enemy merchant vessel acts as an auxiliary to the enemy armed
forces (e.g., carrying troops or replenishing warships).
(c) When an enemy merchant vessel engages in reconnaissance or otherwise
assists in intelligence gathering for the enemy armed forces.
(d) When an enemy merchant vessel refuses an order to stop or actively resists
capture.
(e) When an enemy merchant vessel is armed to an extent that it can inflict
damage on a warship (especially a submarine).
(f) When an enemy merchant vessel travels under a convoy escorted by
warships, thereby benefiting from the (more powerful) armament of the
latter.
(g) When an enemy merchant vessel makes an effective contribution to
military action (e.g., by carrying military materials).136
Some vessels—above all, passenger liners exclusively engaged in carrying
civilian passengers—are generally exempted from attack.137 Even if the pas-
senger liner is carrying a military cargo in breach of the requirement of
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exclusive civilian engagement, an attack against it may be unlawful because it
would be clearly disproportionate to the military advantage expected.138
4. Neutral Merchant Vessels
Neutral merchant vessels are generally immune from attack, although sub-
ject to visit and search by belligerent warships (and military aircraft) and pos-
sible capture for adjudication as prize in appropriate circumstances.139
Nevertheless, according to the San Remo Manual, neutral merchant vessels
are liable to attack—as if they were enemy military objectives—in the six fol-
lowing cases:140
(a) When a neutral merchant vessel is engaged in belligerent acts on behalf of
the enemy.
(b) When a neutral merchant vessel acts as an auxiliary to the enemy armed
forces.
(c) When a neutral merchant vessel assists the enemy’s intelligence system.
(d) When a neutral merchant vessel is suspected of breaching a blockade or of
carrying contraband and clearly refuses an order to stop, or resists visit,
search or capture.
(e) When a neutral merchant vessel travels under a convoy escorted by enemy
warships.
(f) When a neutral merchant vessel makes an effective contribution to the
enemy’s military action (e.g., by carrying military materials).141
Thus, “[t]he mere fact that a neutral merchant vessel is armed provides no
grounds for attacking it.”142 As for traveling under convoy, the entitlement to
attack a neutral merchant vessel exists only when the convoy is escorted by
enemy warships. Neutral merchant vessels traveling under convoy escorted by
neutral warships, in transit to neutral ports, cannot be attacked (and are not
subject to visit and search).143 The neutral escort can also belong to a State
other than the State of the flag.144 During the Iran-Iraq War, the practice de-
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escorted by warships of another (like the United States).145 But reflagging (in
the absence of a “genuine link” between the merchant vessels and their new
flag State146) is not strictly necessary. Suffice it for the two neutral States to
conclude an agreement enabling the flag State of the escorting warships to
verify and warrant that the merchant vessel (flying a different neutral flag) is
not carrying contraband and is not otherwise engaged in activities inconsis-
tent with its neutral status.147
Of course, neutral passenger liners would benefit from special protection.148
5. Destruction of Enemy Merchant Vessels after Capture
When enemy merchant vessels are protected from attack that does not
mean that they cannot be destroyed. The rule is that warships (and military
aircraft) have a right to capture enemy merchant vessels, with a view to taking
them into port for adjudication and condemnation as prize.149 As an excep-
tional measure, when circumstances preclude taking it into port, the captured
merchant vessel may be destroyed.150 The legality of the destruction of the
captured ship is to be adjudicated by the prize court.151
There is a vital distinction between the destruction of an enemy merchant
vessel subsequent to capture and an attack launched against it on the ground
that it constitutes a military objective. An enemy merchant vessel liable to at-
tack as a military objective can be sunk at sight with all those on board. Con-
versely, the destruction of an enemy merchant vessel in the exceptional
circumstances following capture can only take place subject to the dual condi-
tion that (i) the safety of passengers and crew is assured; (ii) the documents
and papers relating to the prize proceedings are safeguarded.152 A special
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Procès-Verbal of 1936 applies this general rule to submarine warfare.153 The
Procès-Verbal specifies that the ship’s boats are not regarded as a place of
safety for the passengers and crew unless that safety is assured by the existing
sea and weather conditions, the proximity of land, or the presence of another
vessel in a position to take them on board.154 The San Remo Manual follows
the Procès-Verbal, adding an important caveat: the vessel subject to destruc-
tion must not be a passenger liner.155
6. Exclusion Zones
The San Remo Manual rejects the notion that a belligerent may absolve it-
self of its duties under international humanitarian law by establishing mari-
time “exclusion zones,” which might enable it to attack enemy merchant
vessels and even neutral ships entering the zones.156 The practice of establish-
ing exclusion zones evolved during World Wars I and II, and was resorted
to—albeit with considerable conceptual differences—in the Iran-Iraq War
and in the Falkland Islands War.157 It is clear from the 1946 Judgment of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg that the sinking of neutral mer-
chant vessels without warning when entering unilaterally proclaimed exclu-
sion zones, is unlawful.158 This holding is not germane, however, to enemy
merchant vessels in such zones.159
Most commentators agree that, given the on-going practice, the legality of
exclusion zones should be acknowledged in some manner.160 The San Remo
Manual itself concedes that belligerents may establish exclusion zones as ex-
ceptional measures, subject to the condition that no new rights be ac-
quired—and no existing duties be absolved—through such establishment.161
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The condition is somewhat softened when the Manual adds that, should a bel-
ligerent create an exclusion zone, “it might be more likely to presume that
ships or aircraft in the area without permission were there for hostile pur-
poses.”162 This proviso “allows a ‘grey area,’”163 although incontestably exclu-
sion zones must not become “free-fire zones,” and specified sea lanes ensuring
safe passage to hospital ships, neutral shipping, etc., must be made available.164
Evidently, the specifics of a new law regarding exclusion zones have not yet
crystallized.165 Until the new law emerges in detail, the lex lata remains valid,
so that “an otherwise protected platform does not lose that protection by
crossing an imaginary line drawn in the ocean by a belligerent.”166
The reverse side of the coin is that enemy warships—being military objec-
tives subject to attack at sight—do not gain any protection by staying away
from an exclusion zone. Consequently, there was no legal fault in the sinking
by the British of the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano outside a pro-
claimed exclusion zone (in the course of the Falkland Islands War of 1982):
an enemy warship “has no right to consider itself immune” from attack beyond
the range of an exclusion zone.167
7. Bombardment of Coastal Areas
A special problem arises with respect to the bombardment from the sea of
enemy coastal areas. The matter is governed by Hague Convention (IX) of
1907, which sets forth in Article 1: “The bombardment by naval forces of un-
defended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings is forbidden.”168 Article
2, for its part, clarifies that military works, military or naval establishments,
depots of arms or war materials, workshops or plants which can be utilized for
the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and warships in the harbor, are excluded
166
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from this prohibition.169 Article 3—which is “a throwback to a bygone era of
naval warfare”170—permits the bombardment of ports, towns, etc., if the local
authorities (having been summoned to do so) fail to furnish supplies to the
naval force before them.171
Article 1 of Hague Convention (IX) applies to coastal bombardment a land
warfare rule, laid down in Article 25 of Hague Convention (IV). As noted,
the sweeping reference in the Hague Conventions to entire towns as either
defended or undefended (and accordingly subject to, or exempted from, at-
tack) is obsolete, and the term “localities”—employed by Protocol I—is
more precise. Additionally, coastal bombardments are in general different
from land warfare. Whereas on land a bombardment usually serves as a pre-
lude to assault on the target with a view to its occupation, naval bombard-
ment is more frequently intended to inflict sheer destruction on the enemy
rear (only exceptionally is the intention to land troops).172 If there is room for
some elasticity in treating whole sections of a city as a single military objec-
tive—when house-to-house combat is raging—no similar impetus affects
coastal bombardment. The grafting of a land warfare rule onto coastal bom-
bardment is therefore inappropriate.173
A specific issue in the context of coastal bombardment is that of light-
houses. Can they be treated as military objectives? On the one hand, they de-
serve protection as installations designed to ensure the safety of navigation in
general.174 On the other hand, the French Court of Cassation held in 1948
that a lighthouse is a military objective, since it can be used for the needs of a
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Special Problems Relating to Air Warfare
1. Military Aircraft
Enemy military aircraft—and any other military aerial platforms, including
gliders, drones, blimps, dirigibles, etc.—are legitimate targets for attack. In
fact, air combat is intrinsically different from land or sea combat, considering
that (i) it is most difficult for a military aircraft in flight to convey a wish to
surrender (i.e., there is no effective counterpart in the air to the land or sea
method of hoisting a white flag, striking colors or—in the case of subma-
rines—surfacing); and (ii) it is generally permissible to continue to fire upon a
military aircraft even after it has become clearly disabled.176 (Although, under
Article 42 of Protocol I, persons parachuting from an aircraft in distress—in
contradistinction to airborne troops—must not be made the object of attack
during their descent, and upon reaching hostile ground must be given an op-
portunity to surrender.177)
2. Civilian Aircraft
Enemy civilian aircraft per se do not constitute military objectives. Still,
civilian aircraft are subject to rather stringent strictures under the non-
binding Hague Rules of Air Warfare, whereby enemy civilian aircraft in flight
are liable to be fired upon—as if they were military objectives—in the follow-
ing circumstances:
(a) When flying within the jurisdiction of their own State, should enemy
military aircraft approach and they do not make the nearest available
landing.178
(b) When flying (i) within the jurisdiction of the enemy; or (ii) in the
immediate vicinity thereof and outside the jurisdiction of their own State;
or (iii) in the immediate vicinity of the military operations of the enemy by
land or sea (the exceptional right of prompt landing is inapplicable).179
Even neutral civilian aircraft are exposed to the risk of being fired upon if
they are flying within the jurisdiction of a belligerent, are warned of the ap-
proach of military aircraft of the opposing side, and do not land
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immediately.180 Thus, the only advantage that neutral civilian aircraft have
over belligerent civilian aircraft within enemy airspace is that the neutral ci-
vilian aircraft must be warned first (belligerent civilian aircraft in that situa-
tion must establish at their own peril whether the enemy military aircraft are
approaching).
These provisions have been criticized as impractical, addressing an improb-
able contingency (of civilian aircraft venturing into the enemy’s jurisdiction),
and creating new and difficult categories (what is the vicinity of the enemy’s
jurisdiction?).181 Although the Hague Rules have generally had a substantial
influence on the evolution of customary international law182—and their im-
pact on the terminology adopted by the framers of Protocol I has been
noted—it is impossible to forget that they were enunciated in 1923, at the
dawn of civil aviation and prior to the exponential growth of passenger traffic
by air. The normal modern procedure of declaring air exclusion zones in war-
time is supposed to preclude any type of undesirable overflight in sensitive
areas.183 But even within a “no-fly” zone, it is arguable that attack against
civilian aircraft in flight should follow a due warning.184 Outside “no-fly”
zones, the contemporary jus in bello (as corroborated by military manuals) for-
bids attacks against civilian aircraft in flight unless they are utilized for military
purposes or refuse to respond to interception signals; and civilian airliners (en-
gaged in passenger traffic) are singled out for special protection.185 Still, as
demonstrated by the lamentable 1988 incident of the US cruiser USS
Vincennes shooting down an Iranian passenger aircraft (with 290 civilians on
board), the speed of modern electronics often creates insurmountable prob-
lems of erroneous identification.186
The status of civilian aircraft is different when they are not in flight (nor in
the process of taking off or landing with passengers), but parked on the
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ground. It must be recalled that the airport in which they are parked is liable
to be deemed a military objective, so the civilian aircraft may be at risk owing
to its mere presence there.187 Moreover, irrespective of where they are situ-
ated, civilian aircraft are often viewed as constituting “an important part of
the infrastructure supporting an enemy’s war-fighting capability,” since they
can be used later for the transport of troops or military supplies.188
3. Strategic and “Target Area” Bombing
The most crucial issue of air warfare is that of strategic bombing, to wit,
bombing of targets in the interior, beyond the front line (the contact zone).
Conditions of air warfare have always defied the logic of the distinction be-
tween defended and undefended sites, enshrined in the traditional law of Ar-
ticle 25 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, although the words “by whatever
means” were inserted into the Article with the deliberate intention of cover-
ing “attack from balloons.”189 After all, there is no real meaning to lack of de-
fenses in situ as long as the front line remains a great distance away. First, a
rear zone is actually defended (however remotely) by the land forces facing
the enemy on the front line. Secondly, the fact that a place in the interior is
undefended by land forces while the front line is far-off is no indication of fu-
ture events: it may still be converted into an impregnable citadel once the
front line gets nearer. Thirdly, and most significantly for air warfare, the em-
placement of anti-aircraft guns and fighter squadrons en route from the front
line to the rear zone may serve as a more effective screen against intruding
bombers than any defense mechanism provided locally.190
For these and other reasons, the Hague Rules of Air Warfare introduced
the concept of military objectives, endorsed and further elaborated—with a
new definition—by Protocol I. However, strategic bombing triggers the com-
plementary question whether it is permissible to treat a cluster of military ob-
jectives in relative spatial proximity to each other as a single “target area.”
The issue arises occasionally in some settings of long-range artillery bombard-
ment. But it is particularly apposite to air warfare, in which target identifica-
tion may be detrimentally affected by poor visibility (especially as a result of
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inclement weather), effective air defense systems, failure of electronic devices
(sometimes because of enemy jamming), sophisticated camouflage, etc. Thus,
when the target is screened by determined air defense, the attacking force may
be compelled to conduct a raid from the highest possible altitudes, compro-
mising precision bombing (especially when “smart bombs” are unavailable).191
The practice which evolved during World War II was that of “saturation
bombings,” aimed at large “target areas” in which there were heavy concentra-
tions of military objectives (as well as civilian objects).192 Such air attacks were
designed to blanket or envelop the entire area where military objectives
abounded, rather than search for a point target.193 The operating assumption
was that, if one military objective would be missed, others stood a good chance
of being hit. This practice (entailing, as it did, immense civilian casualties by
way of “collateral damage”) was harshly criticized after the war.194
The World War II experience may create the impression that “target area”
bombing is relevant mostly to sizeable tracts of land—like the Ruhr Valley in
Germany—where the preponderant presence of first-class military objectives
stamps an indelible mark on their surroundings, thereby creating “an indivisi-
ble whole.”195 But the dilemma whether or not to lump together as a single tar-
get several military objectives may be prompted even by run-of-the-mill
objects when they are located at a relatively small distance from each other.
The dilemma is addressed by Article 51(5)(a) of Protocol I, where it is prohib-
ited to conduct “an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which
treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct
military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a
similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects.”196
While placing a reasonable limitation on the concept of “target area”
bombing, Article 51(5)(a) does not completely ban it. “Target area” bombing
is still legitimate when the military objectives are not clearly separated and
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distinct. Understandably, “the interpretation of the words ‘clearly separated
and distinct’ leaves some degree of latitude to those mounting an attack.”197 In
particular, the adverb “clearly” blurs the issue: is the prerequisite clarity a mat-
ter of objective determination or subjective appreciation (depending, e.g., on
the degree of visibility when weather conditions are poor)?198 Another ques-
tion is what a “similar concentration” of civilian objects within the “target
area” means in practice. The ambiguities are regrettable, keeping in mind that
“target area” bombing stretches to the limit the principle of distinction be-
tween military objectives and civilian objects.
Conclusion
It is difficult to overstate the importance of establishing authoritatively the
compass of military objectives in conformity with the jus in bello. In exposing
military objectives to attack, and (as a corollary) immunizing civilian objects,
the principle of distinction provides the main line of defense against methods
of barbarism in warfare. The validity of the principle cannot be seriously con-
tested today, and it may be regarded as lying at the epicenter of the law regu-
lating the conduct of hostilities. Unfortunately, the Devil is in the detail. As
this paper should amply demonstrate, the detail is far from resolved by the cur-
rent lex scripta (specifically Protocol I). There is an evident need for further
expounding quite a few aspects of the accepted definition of military objec-
tives. This need becomes more urgent with the dramatic changes in the mod-
ern techniques of combat. The jus in bello cannot afford to lag far behind the
changing conditions of combat.
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